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Abstract: We use variation in historical state centralization to
examine the long-term impact of institutions on cultural norms. The
Kuba Kingdom, established in Central Africa in the early 17th century
by King Shyaam, had more developed state institutions than the
other independent villages and chieftaincies in the region. It had
an unwritten constitution, separation of political powers, a judicial
system with courts and juries, a police force, a military, taxation, and
significant public goods provision. Comparing individuals from the
Kuba Kingdom to those from just outside the Kingdom, we find that
centralized formal institutions are associated with weaker norms of
rule following and a greater propensity to cheat for material gain.
This finding is consistent with recent models where endogenous
investments to inculcate values in children decline when there is an
increase in the effectiveness of formal institutions that enforce socially
desirable behavior. Consistent with such a mechanism, we find that
Kuba parents believe it is less important to teach children values
related to rule-following behaviors.
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1. Introduction
Recent evidence suggests that both culture and institutions are important for economic develop-
ment.1 While culture and institutions are often studied in isolation, it is likely that they interact
in important ways. In this paper, we study the effect that institutions have on culture. There
are a variety of plausible ways that institutions could affect cultural traits. One possibility is that
stronger institutions inculcate cultural values that further reinforce the institutions themselves.
For example, if institutions incentivize people to engage in a pattern of behavior, this may, in
turn, cause individuals to view this pattern of behavior as natural or normal, and to experience
disutility when they deviate from this behavior. A number of scholars have argued for this form
of complementarity between institutions and culture (Elias, 1994, Weber, 1976, Foucault, 1995).2
Another possibility is that institutions associated with state formation undermine norms of
rule following. There are a number of different theoretical mechanisms that generate such an
effect. One is the direct psychological effect that arises due to motivational crowding-out, where
external material incentives often crowd out intrinsic motivations (Deci, Koestner and Ryan, 1999,
Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012). Although the phenomenon occurs at the individual-level and
over short time frames, and is generally not thought to operate in the longer run, a similar
mechanism that operates over multiple generations can be found in the model developed by
Tabellini (2008b). The model examines individuals’ decisions to cooperate or cheat in a one-
shot prisoners’ dilemma. Because the game is one-shot, based on purely monetary incentives,
it is always in an individual’s best interest to not cooperate. However, individuals also have an
intrinsic preference against cheating. In the model, there are good types and bad types. The good
types get more disutility from cheating than bad types. Parents can make costly investments in
their children to inculcate a dislike for cheating.3
The model features a form of crowding out that is analogous to motivational-crowding, except
1Institutions are typically defined as the external ‘rules of the game’ that shape individuals’ expected material
payoffs for different actions (e.g., North and Thomas, 1973, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). Culture, by
contrast, is generally defined as values, beliefs, and preferences that are internal to individuals in a society (e.g.,
Tabellini, 2008a).
2Sociologist Norbert Elias (1994) argues that in early modern Europe, state formation generated a “civilizing
process” that induced people to internalize rule-abiding behavior (Elias, 1994, p. 367). Historian Eugene Weber (1976),
argues that the formation of the French state in the 19th century transformed France’s diverse population into a
citizenry socialized to obey the rules, and in particular, to pay taxes and to serve in the military. Michel Foucault
(1995) argues that a defining characteristic of modern society is the movement from a setting in which people obey the
law because they fear punishment to one where individuals obey because they absorb the laws as internal norms.
3Because parents evaluate their child’s actions using their own preferences, good parents want to have good
children, and bad parents want to have bad children.
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that it works over many generations. In the model, if institutions become better at ensuring that
bad children behave like good children, then parents reduce their investments aimed at making
sure their child is a good type.4 Since parents only care about the actions of their children,
not their preferences per se, the benefit of exerting effort to inculcate an intrinsic dislike for
cheating is lower with better state enforcement. Parents know that their children will be prevented
from cheating by the state whether or not they invest in instilling such preferences themselves.
Therefore, formal institutions crowd out intrinsic preferences for good behavior.
Although Tabellini (2008b) does not provide empirical evidence for this mechanism in his
model, there is existing evidence consistent with such a crowd-out effect. For example, Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales (2004) find that within Italian provinces with weak legal institutions, high
levels of social capital are necessary to sustain financial transactions. However, in provinces
with an effective legal system, lower levels of social capital are satisfactory. The mechanism of
Tabellini’s model also fits with historical arguments that states can induce perverse cultural dy-
namics, which ultimately lead to their collapse, ancient Rome being perhaps the most prominent
example (e.g., Gibbon, 1996, MacMullen, 1990).
In this paper, we contribute to our understanding of the effect of institutions on culture
by providing an empirical study of the long-term impact of state formation on individuals’
propensity to follow rules and obey laws. Our analysis exploits variation from an historical
natural experiment in Central Africa: the creation of the Kuba Kingdom in the 17th century. A
number of characteristics of the creation of the Kingdom make this historical episode particularly
well suited for estimating the causal effect of state formation on norms of rule following. First,
during the medieval period, about two centuries prior to the formation of the Kingdom, there
was a large migration of related Mongo peoples to an area near the confluence of the Kasai and
Sankuru rivers. This migration is illustrated in figure 1, along with the boundaries of the Kuba
Kingdom some two centuries later. According to oral histories, these groups are descendants of a
mythical ancestor named Woot. One implication of this migration is that, prior to the formation
of the Kingdom, the population of the region was culturally homogeneous. The common cultural
origins of the pre-treatment population helps alleviate concerns of reverse causality, namely that
initial cultural differences caused the formation of the Kuba Kingdom in one area, but not the
4In the model, this effect occurs when enforcement is particularly effective for matches between “close” players.
Given our interest in within state interactions, not cross-state interactions, we view this as the empirically relevant
scenario of the model.
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other.
The second significant aspect of the episode is the manner in which the Kingdom was estab-
lished and its boundaries determined. The Kingdom was formed when Shyaam, an institutional
entrepreneur and an outsider, united a group of villages and small chieftaincies (Vansina, 1978,
p. 127). Following this, the Kingdom’s boundaries were determined by the particular geography
of the area. As shown in figure 1, the region where the “children of Woot” settled is naturally
divided by the Kasai and Sankuru rivers. Shyaam established the Kingdom to the south of
the Sankuru and to the east of the Kasai. During his reign and those of subsequent kings, the
Kingdom expanded to the natural limits defined by these rivers. The boundaries of the Kuba
Kingdom remained stable and clearly defined by the Kasai river (to the west), Sankuru river
(to the north), and Lulua river (to the south). Although the specific location of these natural
boundaries was otherwise unimportant, the location of the rivers determined which villages were
inside and outside of the Kuba Kingdom. Thus, our interpretation of the Kuba Kingdom as a
natural experiment relies on the assumption that the establishment of the Kingdom to the east of
the Kasai river, rather than to the west, occurred for reasons unrelated to pre-existing differences
in the populations or the environment that could affect our outcomes of interest.
The Kuba Kingdom had many characteristics that are associated with modern states, making
the estimated effects of the Kuba state on cultural norms of general interest. The Kingdom had a
professional bureaucracy, a system of taxation, extensive public goods provision, an unwritten
constitution, a sophisticated legal system that featured trial by jury and courts of appeal, a
professional police force, and a military. Amongst travelers and ethnographers of the Kuba
Kingdom, comparisons have regularly been made to other centralized states like Augustan Rome,
Imperial Japan, or the Ancient Egyptian civilization (Torday and Joyce, 1910, pp. 13, 60, Sheppard,
1917, p. 187).
Our analysis compares individuals whose ancestors lived within the Kuba Kingdom to indi-
viduals whose ancestors lived just outside the Kingdom, and tests for differences in the propensity
to follow rules, even when there is a strong monetary incentive to not do so. We measure rule
following using two sets of behavioral experiments. The first is the resource allocation game
(RAG).5 In the experiment, there is a cost to following the rules and a benefit to cheating.
5The experiment was recently developed by Hruschka, Efferson, Jiang, Falletta-Cowden, Sigurdsson, McNamara,
Sands, Munira, Slingerland and Henrich (2014).
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Although it is impossible for us or anyone else to know if any specific individual cheats, we
are able to measure whether groups of individuals cheat by observing aggregate outcomes in a
larger sample. The second experiment is a version of the standard ultimatum game, in which
participants physically allocate money in a private setting, rather than play on a computer. This
provides an opportunity for individuals to steal money during the experiment.
In our analysis, we consider three samples. The first sample is the largest and includes all
individuals whose ancestors lived inside and just outside the Kuba Kingdom (499 individuals
in total). The second sample exploits the particular history of the region by including only the
descendants of Woot, the population that was culturally homogeneous prior to the creation of the
Kuba Kingdom. The descendants of Woot who remained outside the Kuba Kingdom are today
called the Lele. Therefore, our second sample includes the central Kuba (the Children of Woot
who were inside the Kuba Kingdom) and the Lele (105 individuals in total). This is the cleanest
comparison, as it exploits the cultural regression-discontinuity that arises due to the historical
natural experiment described above. The third sample focuses specifically on the core people
of the Kuba Kingdom, the Bushong, and compares them to the Lele (82 individuals).6 This
comparison has two motivations. First, the existing anthropological literature has focused on
comparisons of the Bushong and Lele (e.g., Douglas, 1962, 1963, Vansina, 1963, 1964, 1978, 1990,
2010). Second, focusing on the Bushong helps address the issue of whether the Kuba institutions
were viewed as legitimate by its citizens. The Bushong lived in the heart of the Kingdom and
were disproportionately represented in the capital city and the government bureaucracy. Thus,
of all groups, they were most likely to view Kuba institutions as legitimate.
Using our experimental measures of rule following, a consistent and robust set of empirical
results emerge. We find that Kuba ancestry is associated with more rule breaking and more theft.
This is true for both experiments and for all three samples of interest. These findings demonstrate
that culture can be shaped by state institutions, and that, at least in this instance, state institutions
and culture are not complements, as hypothesized by Elias, Weber, and Foucault, but instead are
substitutes as predicted in the model of Tabellini (2008b). Thus, our results are most consistent
with the Kuba state crowding out internal norms of rule following.
Comparing the estimates from each of our three sample populations, we find that our restricted
6The first sample includes 80 Kuba and 419 non-Kuba; the second 61 central Kuba and 44 Lele, and the third 38
Bushong and 44 Lele.
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samples produce (negative) estimates of the Kuba Kingdom on rule following that are larger in
magnitude than for the full sample. Given that we expect the restricted-sample estimates, which
exploit the cultural regression discontinuity, to be better identified than the full-sample estimates,
this suggests a positive reverse effect of culture on institutions. Groups with stronger norms of
rule following are more likely to establish more centralized and formal state structures. This
causes non-identified estimates of the effect of state centralization on rule-following norms to
be biased upwards. This is a potential explanation for why other studies have found a positive
correlation between developed institutions and cultural traits that one expects may be correlated
with rule following (e.g, Tabellini, 2010, Gachter and Schulz, 2016), while we estimate a causal
negative impact.
After estimating the reduced-form relationship between the Kuba state and rule following, we
then consider potential threats to inference: selective migration to the research site, differences
in the geography of individuals’ ancestral villages, and differences in other cultural traits that
could affect actions in the behavioral experiments. Using information on individuals’ migration
histories, the geography of their ancestral villages, and measures of other cultural traits, we check
whether these factors confound our estimates. We find no evidence for this.
Our analysis then turns to underlying mechanisms. With Tabellini’s (2008b) model in mind,
we examine whether Kuba institutions are associated with lower investments by parents to instill
values related to rule following and against cheating. Using survey questions that ask parents
which traits they feel are important to teach their children, we find that, on average, Kuba parents
believe it is less important to teach values related to obedience and rule following than non-Kuba
parents. We also check whether the Kuba appear to place less importance on values that are
unrelated to rule following, such as instilling imagination or originality in their children. We find
no statistically significant difference along these dimensions. These correlations are consistent
with the Kuba state causing a decline in investments made by parents to teach values associated
with rule following to their children.
We then turn to additional channels that could also explain our findings. We first consider
current income and prosperity. By all accounts, the establishment of the Kuba Kingdom facilitated
economic growth, and this could explain part of the difference in rule following that we observe.
Another potential channel is that the Kuba may have been treated differently by the national state
during the colonial and/or post colonial-periods. We test for these channels using various mea-
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sure of current income, information about the locations of colonial investments, and individuals
implicit and explicit views about former president Joseph Mobutu. We find no evidence that the
lower rates of rule following among the Kuba are explained by either of these channels.
Our study complements the findings from recent studies that have shown the beneficial
effects of pre-colonial state centralization for contemporary economic development (Gennaioli
and Rainer, 2007, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013, 2014a). In particular, our empirical
strategy, which focuses on a particularly informative historical setting, complements the strategy
of these studies, which is to look at a broader cross-section of data. A benefit of our strategy is
that causal inference is improved. However, an important caveat is that our estimates are for one
particular state, which is important since the causal impact of state formation may depend on the
nature of the state being considered. In addition, our analysis estimates the impacts of a package
of institutions, and we are unable to provide causal estimates of particular components of the
state or its policies.
Our estimates also complement studies that examine the cultural impacts of living under
different types of state institutions. For example, Becker, Boeckh, Hainz and Woessmann (2015)
compare the long-term effects of living under the Habsburg Empire versus the Ottoman Empire;
Tabellini (2010) examines the effects of living within nation states with greater or fewer constraints
on the executive; and Hruschka et al. (2014) examines current nations and the link between public
good provision and cheating.7
We now turn to a more detailed discussion of the historical episode we exploit in our analysis.
This is followed by a description of our sampling frame and data collection in section 3, and of
our experimental measures in section 4. In section 5, we report our baseline estimates and test for
potential threats to inference in section 6. In section 7 we turn to an examination of mechanisms.
Section 8 concludes.
2. Historical Background
We now turn to a brief overview of the historical setting. For the interested reader, we provide a
more thorough description in the paper’s online appendix.
7A number of studies also examine the impacts of institutions on culture, but in purely experimental settings (e.g.,
Cassar, d’Adda and Grosjean, 2014, Rand, 2016).
6
K asuk
u
Lukeni
L ukenie
K
wi lu
W
a
m
b
a
L
u
lua
Lulu
a
K
as
ai
Kasai
Ka
sai
Sankuru
L
om
a
m
i
Tsuap
a
Lo
m
ela
L
oa
n
g
e
S
ank
ur uM
b
u
ji -
M
a
yi
K
w
an
g
o
C
o
n
g
o
C
ongo
Sankuru
Kananga
µ
0 30 60 90 12015
Miles
Legend
Kuba-Lele expansion
Nkumu expansion
Historical Kuba Kingdom boundary
^ Kananga
Villages of origin
Kuba
Lele
Other tribe
Figure 1: Map showing the migration of the descendants of Woot, the approximate historical
boundaries of the Kuba Kingdom, the location of the origin villages within the sample, and
Kananga.
Prior to the formation of the Kuba Kingdom, a group of Mongo peoples migrated to the region
from the northwest, crossing the Sankuru river sometime in the Medieval period. The migration
included ancestors of many different groups, some of whom were later integrated into the Kuba
Kingdom – namely, the Bushong, Ngeende, Pyang, Bulaang, and Bieeng – and others of whom
were not – the Lele (Vansina, 1978, p. 56, Vansina, 1990, Map 4.4, p. 124). Following Vansina (1978,
p. 5), we refer to the five groups that later became a part of the Kuba Kingdom as the “central
Kuba,” distinguishing them from other groups that became part of the Kingdom but were not
part of the same migration, which are referred to as the “peripheral Kuba”.
The central Kuba and Lele trace the origin of the world to Mboom, who was the son of the
first man, who was named Woot. According to oral history, Woot committed incest with his
sister Mweel, and they were cast out of the primeval village, leading to their migration. From
this relationship, a series of children were born (Vansina, 1978, p. 32), who are the ancestors
of the different groups within the central Kuba and Lele (Torday, 1925, pp. 127–128, Wharton,
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1927, p. 66). The oral history, which attributes a common ancestry to the central Kuba and Lele,
is consistent with linguistic evidence. The central Kuba and Lele both speak languages that
diverged from a common Bantu-based language called Mongo, which is evidence of common
linguistic and cultural roots (Gunthrie, 1971).
The Kuba Kingdom formed in the early 17th century (probably in the 1620s) when an outsider
named Shyaam first made himself the chief of the Bushong – one of the groups descended from
Woot located to the east of the Kasai river – by overthrowing the existing chief. He then united the
independent villages and small chieftaincies in the region into one large kingdom. According to
the historical record, Shyaam’s success in uniting the region stemmed from several characteristics:
he was a magician and medicine man; he had travelled widely; and he had access to long-distance
trade networks. Although the story of King Shyaam may seem exceptional, the formation of
Kingdoms by outsiders was common in Africa historically (Sahlins, 2008).
After its founding, the Kuba Kingdom expanded to the boundaries shown in figure 1. The
Kingdom was naturally separated from several neighboring societies by three rivers: the Kasai
(on the West), the Sankuru (on the North), and the Lulua (on the South). The peoples on the
other sides of the rivers, even the Lele (the other descendants of Woot) who had migrated to the
region with the Bushong, were never unified under a centralized state. Thus, the borders of the
Kingdom were determined by two factors: the location of the rivers in the region and the location
of the Kingdom’s origin relative to the rivers.
The Kuba Kingdom was not the only large precolonial state in Central Africa, but it was the
only such state in our region of interest (Vansina, 1966). None of the groups who occupied the
region, including those who migrated with the Bushong but stayed outside of the Kuba Kingdom,
achieved anything close to the same degree of political centralization.
There are two aspects of the Kingdom that are particularly notable and of relevance for our
study. In Vansina’s (1978, p. 3) own words, these are the “intricacy of the political system” and
“the sophistication of Kuba legal procedures”.
A defining feature of the Kuba political structure was its division and balance of power. The
territory of the Kuba Kingdom was divided into nine provinces that were themselves subdivided
into counties, each of which had a head chief (Vansina, 1978, p. 128). The Kingdom had executive
councils, professional bureaucracies, a military, and police forces. The executive, apart from the
king, comprised a system of title holders, called kolm. There were 120 distinct titles in the late
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19th century. Though some of these titles were reserved for members of 18 aristocratic clans, the
majority were appointed meritocratically. The king interacted with four main councils. The most
significant of these was the ishyaaml, which had the authority to veto the king’s orders and edicts.
If a veto occurred, the issue went to another council, the mbok ilaam, which had procedures for
reaching a compromise (Vansina, 1978, pp. 145–152).
The judicial system included trial by jury and appellate courts. In this system, there were
two judicial fora, the moots and the courts, both with multiple levels: the clan, the village, the
chiefdom, and the Kingdom. Minor disputes were dealt with by moots, informal assemblies
of relatives and kinsmen who heard evidence and arbitrated in public meetings. More serious
offenses went to courts, in which a panel of judges with particular expertise or experience in the
crime or dispute under consideration would be selected. From the basic court, appeals could
be made to another court headed by a particular kolm, called a baang. From this court, appeal
could be made to yet a higher court presided over by the kikaam, the highest bureaucrat in the
Kingdom. A final appeal could then be made to what Vansina (1971, p. 138) describes as the
“supreme court,” where the senior members of the 18 aristocratic clans took part and the king
acted as a spectator, ready to grant a stay of execution if necessary. All cases of murder in the
Kingdom went directly to the supreme court.
Court cases had well defined procedures. If a person brought a case to a judge (kolm), he or
she had to deposit 700 cowrie shells. The case was then directed to the judge most competent
in the relevant dispute, who then formed a panel of judges and chose a day for the trial. The
defendants were informed of this date, and when the time came, they and the witnesses, called
by the defendants or the judges, appeared and gave testimony. The judges then adjourned and
made a decision, which could include fines if a guilty verdict was reached. A defendant, if found
guilty, could then follow a well-defined procedure to appeal to a higher court, which began by
paying a 150 cowrie shell fee to the court that had just handed down the verdict.
Our study is not the first to recognize that the formation of the Kuba Kingdom provides a near
natural experiment suitable for assessing the long-term impacts of state formation. Historian
Jan Vansina and anthropologist Mary Douglas have written extensively comparing the Kuba
Kingdom with the stateless Lele (Vansina, 1963, 1964, 1978, 1990, 2010, Douglas, 1962, 1963).
Douglas (1963) compares the Bushong and Lele, writing that “they are historically related, and
share many cultural values. On the surface, Lele material culture looks so like a counterpart of
9
Bushong that it is worth comparing the two tribes. . . Everything that the Lele have or do, the
Bushong have more and can do better. They produce more, live better, as well as populating the
region more densely than the Lele” (pp. 41–42). She then goes on to compare the institutional
structures of the two groups: “The Bushong managed to develop a well-organized political
system. . . By contrast, the largest political unit of the Lele, the village, was smaller than the
smallest political unit in the Bushong system” (pp. 50–51).
The Lele dealt with disputes and conflicts in a different and less institutionalized way than the
Kuba did. A central point in Douglas (1963) is that there was no overarching system of authority
in Lele territory. Chiefs had minimal authority, and there were no professional bureaucrats,
judges, or policemen (Douglas, 1963). She notes that “anyone who has lived with the Lele will
agree at once that there was no authority. There was no person or body in a village who could
give orders and expect to be obeyed by anyone else” (Douglas, 1963, p. 84). The consequence
of this was that frequency of quarrels, hostilities, violence, and an overall insecurity were much
higher among the Lele than in the Kuba Kingdom (Douglas, 1962).
3. Data Collection
Our sample comprises individuals living in Kananga, the capital of the local province, Kasai
Occidental. As shown in figure 1, Kananga lies to the south of the Kuba Kingdom, about a 300
kilometer drive from Mushenge, the capital of the Kuba Kingdom. Since our Kananga-based
sample is composed of individuals removed from their original institutional environments, but
now living in the same city, we can be more confident that our findings are due to differences
arising from internal norms, rather than the external setting.8 It was also more feasible to collect
data in the city given the poor transportation infrastructure of the region.
The data were collected in the dry season (June to August) in 2013 and 2014. Because no
census has been conducted in recent years, we used Google satellite imagery to identify and
randomly choose households for our sample. Details of the sampling procedure, as well as
the satellite images used are reported in the online appendix. Our random sample comprised
2,144 households (1,079 in 2013 and 1,065 in 2014). Because the random sample yielded a
relatively small number of observations with ancestors who were from the Kuba Kingdom, we
8This follows previous studies that have also used this same strategy, including Guiso et al. (2004), Giuliano (2007),
Fernandez and Fogli (2009) and Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013).
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also randomly sampled within specific targeted neighborhoods (polygons) that local leaders said
were likely to have Kuba or Lele inhabitants. The random sample from the targeted polygons
comprised 813 individuals in 2013 and 2,227 individuals in 2014.
From this sample, we then selected the set of individuals relevant for our study. These included
all individuals who: (i) have an origin village or birth village in Mweka, a district whose borders
are nearly identical to that of the historical Kuba Kingdom; (ii) have an origin or birth village in
the districts contiguous to Mweka; or (iii) have an origin village or birth village in other districts,
but who belong to an ethnic group represented in Mweka, namely Kete, Kuba, or Lele. In total,
499 individuals satisfied this criteria.
The individuals in our sample are from 15 different ethnic groups.9 The largest ethnic group is
the Luluwa (160 individuals), which is the dominant ethnic group in the region and in Kananga.
The next largest group is the Kuba (80), followed by the Kete (63), the Luntu (58), the Lele (44)
and the Bindi (40). Among the 80 Kuba descendants, 62 (77%) are descendants of the “central
Kuba”. Further, 38 of the 80 (48%) are Bushong.
Participants in our study were visited by enumerators three times after the initial screening
survey. During the first visit a survey was administered, and during the second and third rounds
we administered behavioral games. The results we present here include all of the behavioral
games that were administered as part of this project. They are not a selective subset of some
larger set of games.
4. Description of Experimental Measures of Rule Following and Cheating
Our first experimental measure of rule following is the resource allocation game (RAG), a non-
strategic game that measures the extent to which participants follow pre-specified rules (Hruschka
et al., 2014). For a single round of the game, the participant is given a six-sided die, with three
black sides and three white sides. The participant is also given a stack of thirty 100cf bills
(3,000cf in total). This is a significant amount, approximately equal to US $3.25, which is about
2–3 days wages. The participant is told that the stack of bills is to be divided between herself
and another party. The other party is either a citizen from Kananga, a coethnic from Kananga,
a non-coethnic from Kananga, or the local provincial government (to be used in a public works
project). The participant is told to allocate the money according to the following procedure. First,
9The ethnic composition of the full sample is reported in the online appendix.
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the participant associates black with one of the two parties (e.g., herself or the government) and
white with the other party. Then she rolls the die and observes the color that is rolled. If it
is white and she had mentally associated white with herself, then she puts the 100cf bill in an
envelope marked for her. If she had mentally associated white with the other party, then she puts
the 100cf bill in the envelope for the other party.
Participants repeat this procedure 30 times, each time making a new color association decision.
The task is performed by the participant alone in the privacy of a tent and is not observed by
anyone, including the person administering the game. Participants are to seal both envelopes in
private, keep the envelope that is for themselves, and place the envelope for the other party in
a bag outside of the tent. Participants play the game four times, dividing the money between
themselves and one of the four parties mentioned above.10 After all games were played, the
enumerator brought the bag back to the central office. Thus, the enumerator never physically
handled the envelopes directly. Prior to the game being played, it was made clear to the
participants that the envelopes would not be opened by the enumerator and would be brought
back to a central office, where they would be opened by one person, who would never tell anyone
the contents of the envelope.
The baseline difference between Kuba and non-Kuba descendants is shown in figure 2a, which
reports the average amount allocated to the other party. The figure reports this for each of the four
different versions of the RAG, as well as the average across the four versions. If individuals were
following the rules, then on average the other party should receive half of the 3,000cf endowment,
or 1,500cf. Yet for both Kuba and non-Kuba participants, the average amount allocated to the
other party (across the four games) is 1,002cf (or 33%), which is well below 1,500cf (50%).11 In
addition, we find that Kuba descendants consistently allocate less to the other party than non-
Kuba descendants.12 In figure 2b, we report the same summary measure of cheating separately
for the six largest ethnic groups in the sample. We see that not only do the Kuba contribute less
than the average of the other ethnic groups, but they contribute less than all of the other primary
10After the games were completed, we distributed the money to the other parties as stated to the participants.
11Our figure of 33% is similar to findings from previous implementations of the RAG (see e.g., Hruschka et al., 2014,
McNamara, Norenzayan and Henrich, 2014).
12In appendix figures A1a–A1c, we report the full distribution of allocations to player 2 for Kuba and non-Kuba
participants in each of the three samples of interest. The support of the distributions is similar between the two groups,
but lower-than-average allocations are relatively more frequent among Kuba descendants and greater-than-average
allocations are relatively less frequent. One can also see that the difference between the two samples is general and
not driven by a small number of observations.
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ethnic groups in the sample (including the Lele).
The RAG imposes a set of unfamiliar rules and instructions on our participants. The benefit
of this is that because the rules are foreign to all, they are likely similarly salient for everyone in
our sample, facilitating a credible comparison of the control and treatment groups. Using a more
familiar set of rules generates the possibility that the rules have differential legitimacy across
different groups. However, we recognize there is a trade off, and one may be concerned that the
rules of the RAG are arbitrary and unrealistic to participants. Given this concern, we supplement
our RAG measure with an alternative measure of rule-breaking, where the rule being broken is
less ad hoc and strange to participants.
The second measure of rule-breaking is based on participants’ actions in a variant of the
standard ultimatum game (UG). In the game, player 1 proposes a division of 1,000cf between
herself and the other player. Player 2 then chooses whether to accept or reject the division. If
player 2 accepts, then the players receive the corresponding amounts offered by player 1 in the
suggested division. If player 2 rejects, then both players receive zero.
An important difference between our version of the UG and standard implementations of the
UG is that we did not use computers or tablets. Instead, participants made their offers as player
1 in private (in a tent) by dividing a stack of ten 100cf bills into two piles. The portion of the
proposed division for player 2 was placed in an envelope marked for player 2, and the portion
for player 1 was placed in an envelope for player 1. Both envelopes were sealed by player 1 and
placed in a bag sitting just outside of the tent. Prior to the game being played, it was made clear to
the participant that the envelope would not be opened by the enumerator and would be brought
back to a central office, where their offer would be randomly matched to acceptance-rejection
decisions of another anonymous individual in our sample. Then, the payouts of the two players
would be determined and given to the two players during the next visit.13
Because individuals made decisions in private and physically handled the money, they had the
opportunity to steal by hiding some of the money on their person (e.g., in a pocket). Although
doing this would reduce the amount offered to player 2 in the game, it ensured that they received
this amount with certainty, independent of the decision of player 2. In our sample, 4.8% of
13Participants played the one-shot anonymous game six times, three times as player 1 and three times as player two.
In the three games as either player 1 or player 2, the player was paired with an anonymous partner: (i) a citizen of
Kananga, (ii) a coethnic from Kananga, and (iii) a non-coethnic from Kananga. For each round, respondents chose their
strategy as player 1 (the proposed division of the 1,000cf) and as player 2 (making acceptance and rejection decisions
for the possible divisions proposed by player 1).
13
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Figure 2: Average behaviors in the RAG and the Ultimatum Game with theft. The reported p-values are for tests of the equality of means
with the Kuba.
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4
participants stole money in at least one round of the UG. Among the Kuba, 10.0% stole, while
among the non-Kuba 3.8% stole. The distribution of the average amount missing by ethnic group
is shown in figure 2c.14 Consistent with the results from the RAG, we see that the Kuba are the
group most likely to break the rules and steal money during the game.
5. Baseline Estimates
We now turn to a more formal test of the long-term effects of the Kuba Kingdom. Specifically, we
estimate the following equation:
yi = α+ βI
Kuba
i
+ XiΓ + εi (1)
where i indexes individuals. IKuba
i
is an indicator variable that equals one if individual i’s
self-reported ethnicity is Kuba. The vector of individual-level covariates, Xi, includes age (in
years), age squared, a female gender indicator variable, and an indicator that equals one if the
individual participated in 2014 (rather than 2013). Motivated by the historical natural experiment,
we estimate equation (1) using three different samples: (i) all observations in the sample, (ii)
descendants of the Central Kuba and the Lele only, and (iii) descendants of the Bushong and the
Lele only.
Estimates of equation (1) are reported in table 1. Panel A reports estimates without covariates,
while panel B reports estimates with the baseline set of control variables. Columns 1–3 report
estimates using the average amount allocated to the other party in the four rounds of the RAG as
our measure of rule following; each column reports estimates from one of the samples of interest.
We find that with or without covariates and for all three samples, the coefficient for the Kuba
ethnicity indicator is negative and statistically significant.15 In addition, estimates from quantile
regression (reported in appendix table A2) show that differences between Kuba and non-Kuba
participants are present in all parts of the distribution. Thus, the estimated Kuba effect is not due
to a small number of observations or to an isolated effect on only part of the distribution.
Columns 4–6 of table 1 report estimates using the total amount missing in the three rounds
of the UG as the dependent variable.16 Using this second measure, we also find that Kuba
14The analogous figure for the fraction that stole looks similar and is reported in appendix figure A2.
15As we report in appendix table A1, one reaches the same conclusion by estimating equation (1) using the outcomes
in each of the different rounds separately.
16The results are qualitatively identical if instead one uses an indicator for the incidence of any missing money.
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Table 1: Baseline estimates in the RAG and UG with theft.
Full	sample Central	Kuba	&	Lele Bushong	&	Lele Full	sample Central	Kuba	&	Lele Bushong	&	Lele(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Kuba	ethnicity	indicator ‐111.51*** ‐141.21** ‐139.77* 59.46** 103.28* 121.05*(42.19) (70.84) (81.52) (25.09) (57.22) (65.99)Observations 499 105 82 499 105 82R‐squared 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04
Kuba	ethnicity	indicator ‐88.47** ‐165.37** ‐209.91** 58.23** 140.24** 150.70**(41.39) (70.92) (81.33) (25.34) (59.27) (69.48)Covariates:Age 1.72 ‐6.50 ‐17.50 6.53** 19.18* 16.91(5.18) (13.47) (17.08) (3.17) (11.26) (14.59)Age	squared ‐0.008 0.071 0.237 ‐0.070** ‐0.230* ‐0.213(0.055) (0.150) (0.190) (0.033) (0.125) (0.162)Female ‐2.99 ‐127.53* ‐136.69 ‐2.32 ‐97.55 ‐86.58(30.41) (73.70) (89.56) (18.62) (61.59) (76.52)Survey	year	=	2014 182.00*** 246.06*** 259.30*** ‐16.84 ‐51.85 ‐39.62(31.03) (72.58) (83.12) (19.00) (60.66) (71.01)Mean	of	dep	var 1,001.75 895.24 912.50 35.07 60.00 56.10Observations 499 105 82 499 105 82
R ‐squared 0.08 0.16 0.17 0.02 0.09 0.08
Average	amount	allocated	to	other	party	(of	3000	CF)	in	the	RAG: Amount	of	money	missing	in	UG
Panel	A.	No	covariates
Panel	B.	With	baseline	covariates
Notes : The table reports OLS estimates of equation (1). "Kuba ethnicity indicator" is a variable that equals one if theindividual's self reported tribe is Kuba. The regressions in panel B control for a gender indicator, age, age squared, anda survey year fixed effect. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicatesignificance	at	the	10,	5,	and	1%	levels.
descendants are less likely to follow rules. The coefficient on the Kuba indicator variable is
positive and significant. As with the RAG measure, we find larger estimates of the Kuba effect
when we restrict the sample to ethnic groups that were culturally homogeneous prior to the
formation of the Kingdom.
In our view, it is significant that the estimated impact based on our historical experiment –
i.e., the central Kuba and Lele comparison, or the Bushong and Lele comparison – is consistently
larger in magnitude than the full-sample estimates. This is because the full-sample estimates are
most likely to be biased due to the reverse effect of culture on institutions. Since values and
beliefs may form the basis of formal rules and institutions, it is possible that cultures that have a
strong belief in the importance of rule following and good behavior will be more likely to develop
and implement state institutions that reflect this. Thus, in contrast to the negative effect of state
institutions on rule following, one could hypothesize that the reverse effect of rule following on
16
state institutions would be positive. Thus, to the extent that the full-sample estimates (which do
not fully exploit our historical natural experiment) also capture this reverse causality, we would
expect these estimates to be biased upwards – i.e., to be less negative. Our results are consistent
with this intuition.
As a robustness check we disaggregate our Kuba indicator variable and allow the effects to
differ for the: (i) central Kuba and peripheral Kuba, and (ii) Bushong, other central Kuba, and
peripheral Kuba. The estimates, which are reported in appendix tables A3 and A4,17 show that
the negative effect of the Kuba on rule following is due to the central Kuba and not the peripheral
Kuba, which is reassuring since it is the central Kuba that comprise the natural experiment.
For the peripheral Kuba, there is the concern that they had stronger norms about cheating ex
ante and therefore were more willing to join the centralized Kingdom with its well-functioning
political and legal systems.
Our findings can be contrasted to other papers that find a positive correlation between different
measures of state quality and socially beneficial cultural traits (Tabellini, 2010, Gachter and Schulz,
2016). One explanation is that the cross-sectional correlations, though more general, are more
likely to capture the reverse causal effect of culture on institutions, and therefore the estimates
may be biased upwards. Another explanation is that the impact of the Kuba on rule following is
not more generally representative of the impact of state centralization on rule following or other
socially beneficial cultural traits. This could be examined if one had cross-cultural measures of
rule-following that could be compared to existing ethnicity level measures of state centralization.
However, such measures do not exist. An alternative socially beneficial trait, although concep-
tually very different from rule-following is trust. It turns out, that this relationship has been
previously estimated in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). In their analysis of the slave trade and
trust, one of their control variables is pre-colonial state centralization taken from the Ethnographic
Atlas. Although the coefficients for the control variables, including state centralization, are not
reported in the published version of the paper, we report these estimates in appendix Table A20.
The authors examine four measures of interpersonal trust and one measure of trust in local
government. Their estimates show that in four of the five specifications state centralization is
negatively correlated with trust.
17Appendix table A3 reports estimates for the full sample, while appendix table A4 restricts the control group to
only include the Lele.
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Taken together, the evidence suggests that the Kuba state is associated with a deterioration
of intrinsic propensity to follow the rules. These results do not imply that the Kuba Kingdom
was not a highly successful and well-functioning state. From the historical and anthropological
literature, we know that it was. Although the state was prosperous and orderly, the evidence
suggests that it eroded the intrinsic preference of its subjects to follow rules. As we show below,
the evidence for mechanisms suggests that it was exactly the success of the Kuba Kingdom – that
its institutions proved capable of encouraging socially desired behaviors – that caused a decline
in rule-following preferences. Before turning to channels, we first address a number of issues that
potentially affect the interpretation of the results just presented.
6. Examining Potential Confounders: Migration, Geography and Other Cultural Traits
Our sample includes individuals who no longer live in the treatment or control regions. They
either migrated from their origin village themselves, or their ancestors migrated at some point in
the past. Most migration to cities from rural villages is due to the better economic opportunities
available in urban areas. Among the 195 individuals in our sample who were born outside
of Kananga and migrated as adults, 144 (74%) migrated because of the greater educational or
economic opportunities available in the city. Most of the remaining, an additional 23 (12%),
migrated because of marriage.18
Despite the economic motivation behind migration, there remains the concern that individuals
who moved to Kananga experienced a selection process that differed systematically between Kuba
and non-Kuba descendants, thereby biasing our estimates. Motivated by this possibility, we check
for differences in observables between the Kuba and non-Kuba populations in each of our three
samples of interest.
The first characteristic that we examine is the extent to which an individual is a recent migrant,
measured by the fraction of their life that has been spent living in Kananga. We also construct
three variables that measure whether individual are integrated into the broader community in
Kananga or living within an ethnic enclave. Using information collected about respondents’ five
closest friends, we calculate the fraction of their friends that are coethnics. Using information on
the ethnic composition of neighborhoods in Kananga from the screening surveys (with a sample of
18See appendix table A5 for the distribution of all reasons for migration. In addition, appendix table A6 shows that
the frequency of reasons is balanced between the different groups.
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Table 2: Balance table for potential confounders.
Not	
accounting	
for	baseline	
covariates
Accounting	
for	baseline	
covariates
Not	
accounting	
for	baseline	
covariates
Accounting	
for	baseline	
covariates
Not	
accounting	
for	baseline	
covariates
Accounting	
for	baseline	
covariates
Age 41.68 -2.434 36.84 5.159* 36.21 5.106
(2.173) (3.024) (3.234)
Female	Indicator 0.465 -0.152** 0.314 0.072 0.268 -0.010
(0.061) (0.092) (0.099)
2014	indicator 0.597 -0.116* 0.410 0.118 0.402 0.133
(0.060) (0.098) (0.109)
Immigrant	indicator 0.537 0.045 0.032 0.552 -0.0663 -0.0338 0.561 -0.0646 -0.0586
(0.061) (0.061) (0.0991) (0.0979) (0.111) (0.113)
Fraction	of	life	in	Kananga 0.663 -0.111** -0.086* 0.553 0.0979 0.0770 0.540 0.0947 0.0968
(0.045) (0.044) (0.0833) (0.0817) (0.0943) (0.0946)
Proportion	of	5	closest	 0.455 -0.110*** -0.102** 0.377 -0.0180 -0.0305 0.398 0.0214 0.0205
friends	that	are	coethnic (0.041) (0.041) (0.0618) (0.0652) (0.0702) (0.0720)
Share	of	own-ethnicity	in 0.303 -0.249*** -0.236*** 0.117 -0.0283 -0.0214 0.133 -0.0027 0.0081
neighborhood (0.036) (0.036) (0.0304) (0.0317) (0.0378) (0.0391)
Ethnic	diversity	of 0.572 0.097*** 0.090*** 0.666 0.00978 0.0144 0.664 0.00831 0.0190
neighborhood (0.023) (0.023) (0.0316) (0.0331) (0.0379) (0.0402)
Maize	suitability 23.10 -0.249 -0.350 23.07 -0.159 0.118 23.12 -0.080 0.120
index,	0-100 (0.217) (0.224) (0.609) (0.676) (0.613) (0.670)
Cassava	suitability 46.69 -0.139 -0.132 47.34 -1.170 -0.437 47.60 -0.917 -0.375
index,	0-100 (0.554) (0.566) (1.508) (1.591) (1.529) (1.596)
Trust	in	international 2.846 -0.010 -0.103 2.867 -0.151 -0.021 2.927 -0.060 -0.038
organizations,	1-4 (0.119) (0.117) (0.194) (0.196) (0.224) (0.230)
Trust	in	other 2.816 -0.048 -0.0522 2.876 -0.213 -0.240 2.915 -0.184 -0.201
nationalities,	1-4 (0.104) (0.105) (0.161) (0.171) (0.178) (0.191)
Trust	in	Universities,	1-4 3.074 0.135 0.0147 3.267 -0.284* -0.129 3.354 -0.169 -0.041
(0.114) (0.109) (0.154) (0.153) (0.165) (0.162)
DG	allocation	to 319.8 -5.76 -3.80 282.9 17.44 13.59 280.5 16.75 17.64
citizen	of	Kananga (24.65) (24.95) (39.18) (41.76) (42.04) (45.10)
DG	allocation	to	coethnic 335.3 -10.74 -12.66 301.9 -24.11 -15.28 295.1 -44.86 -28.72
citizen	of	Kananga (22.09) (22.37) (37.41) (38.52) (39.90) (41.38)
DG	allocation	to	non-coethnic 314.7 -14.56 -14.09 286.7 -30.77 -26.28 279.3 -54.55 -45.81
citizen	of	Kananga (23.44) (23.74) (41.69) (43.38) (46.41) (48.67)
DG	allocation	to 304.7 -21.86 -13.24 231.2 -2.075 -3.450 219.7 -26.55 -27.84
Provincial	Government (27.15) (27.43) (37.03) (39.13) (39.00) (41.77)
Average	DG	allocation	to 319.8 -14.94 -12.46 272.8 0.917 -0.863 266.5 -12.00 -8.693
all	parties (21.17) (21.43) (35.20) (36.74) (37.14) (39.74)
Proportion	incorrect	 0.419 -0.0336 0.00276 0.381 0.0298 -0.0152 0.351 -0.0281 -0.0546
of	four	math	questions,	0-1 (0.0387) (0.0358) (0.0596) (0.0581) (0.0630) (0.0636)
Proportion	incorrect	 0.138 0.0082 0.0292 0.113 0.0647** 0.0393 0.098 0.0488 0.0244
of	six	RAG	questions,	0-1	 (0.0234) (0.0222) (0.0309) (0.0314) (0.0329) (0.0335)
Proportion	incorrect	of	 0.087 0.00327 0.0165 0.070 0.0615*** 0.0453* 0.063 0.0624** 0.0523*
six	UG	questions,	0-1 (0.0167) (0.0163) (0.0230) (0.0236) (0.0256) (0.0272)
Panel	E.	Altruism	Towards	Others
Panel	F.	Understanding	of	the	Games
Notes : The table reports balance statistics. Panel A reports statistics for various immigration-related measures. Panel B reports statistics for the
suitability of a respondent's ancestral village for the cultivation of maize and for the cultivation of cassava. An observation is an individual in our
sample. Statistics are reported for each of our three samples of interest. Panel C reports statistics for indicator variables that measure whether an
ancestral villagewaswithin30 kilometersof aparticular colonial infrastructure in 1951. Anobservation isan individual in our sample. Thestatistics
are	reported	for	each	of	our	three	samples	of	interest.
Full	sample	(n=499) Central	Kuba	vs.	Lele	sample	(n=105) Bushong	vs.	Lele	sample	(n=82)
Kuba	vs.	non-Kuba	
difference
Kuba	vs.	non-Kuba	
difference
Kuba	vs.	non-Kuba	
difference
Panel	B.	Immigration
Panel	C.	Geography
Sample	
mean
Sample	
mean
Sample	
mean
Panel	A.	Baseline	Individual	Characteristics
Panel	D.	Trust	in	Foreign	Researchers
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approximately 5,500), we calculate the share of the population in each person’s neighborhood that
belong to the same ethnicity as them. We also calculate the ethnic diversity of their neighborhood,
measured as one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration.
Differences between the Kuba and non-Kuba samples are reported in panel B of table 2. Within
the full sample, we do observe some statistically significant differences. Kuba descendants have
spent less of their life in Kananga on average, have fewer close friends who are coethnics, live in
neighborhoods with fewer coethnics, and live in more ethnically diverse neighborhoods. This is
true, whether or not we condition on our baseline set of covariates. However, in the restricted
samples, these differences disappear. We find no statistically significant difference in any of the
measures between central Kuba and Lele, or Bushong and Lele.
As an additional check, we re-estimate equation (1) while controlling for the five immigration
variables. We find that the estimates remain robust (see appendix tables A7 and A8). We also
restrict our sample to only include individuals who were born and raised in Kananga.19 Because
those in this subsample did not migrate themselves, migrant although selection effects are likely
weaker in this population. We find that the estimates are very similar (see appendix table A9).
Another possible source of bias are geographic differences between the Kuba Kingdom and
the surrounding areas.20 Any differences that exist could bias our estimates if if they have an
independent effect on cultural evolution. We examine this possibility using fine-grained data on
the suitability of land for the cultivation of maize and cassava (the two staples of the region), both
measured on a 0 to 100 scale.21 We find no difference between the suitability of the origin villages
of Kuba and non-Kuba descendants (see panel B of table 2).22
As noted, one benefit of examining the Kuba Kingdom is that its boundaries were by-and-large
determined by a network of rivers and stable over time. As shown in figure 1, this is true for all
borders except the southeast portion of the Kingdom, which did fluctuate over time. This raises
the concern that this portion of the boundary may be endogenous to the cultural characteristics
19As well, because these are all individuals who were born and raised in the same location, but with different
cultural backgrounds, we can be more confident that we are capturing a purely cultural channel.
20In fact, Mary Douglas (1962, 1963) conjectures that potential differences in crop suitability across the Kasai river
may partially explain differences between the Kuba and Lele.
21The data, which are from the FAO’s GAEZ database, are available at a resolution of 5 arc minutes (approx. 6 miles).
Maps showing the cultivation indices, along with the origin villages for the participants in our sample, are provided
in the paper’s online appendix.
22While the average maize suitability in the sample is approximately 23 (of 100), the average difference between
the Kuba and non-Kuba observations range from 0.08 to 0.25. For cassava suitability, the mean suitability measure is
higher at around 47, while the gap only ranges from 0.14 to 1.17. None of these differences are statistically significant.
As well, the estimates of equation (1) are robust to the inclusion of these controls (appendix table A10).
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of the villages in the area. To address this possibility, we estimate equation (1) while omitting
villages that are within 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 kilometers of this portion of the boundary. As reported
in appendix table A11, the estimates are very similar, and slightly larger in magnitude, when these
villages are omitted.
An important assumption of our analysis is that behavior in the games reflect preferences
against cheating and for rule following. Although previous studies provide verification of this
for cheating games that have a similar structure to the RAG (e.g., Hanna and Wang, 2014, Cohn,
Marechal and Noll, 2015, Cohn and Marechal, 2016), it is possible that other factors – namely
trust in the researchers, altruism towards the other player, or understanding of the rules of the
game – could also affect behavior.
Participants’ trust of our research team could very well influence their behavior in the ex-
perimental games. Although our enumerators are all from Kananga, participants were aware
that researchers from Harvard University were overseeing the project. Thus, their actions in
the RAG could have been shaped by their view of us, and, in particular, whether they trusted
that we really would give the amount allocated to player 2 in the RAG and UG to another
participant as we said we would (and in fact did). To test whether trust in our research team
differed systematically between the Kuba and non-Kuba samples, we asked participants’ their
level of trust in (i) universities, (ii) in international organizations, and in (iii) people from other
countries. Respondents chose between (with assigned numeric values in brackets): not at all (1);
not very much (2); somewhat (3); and completely (4). Estimates of the differences in the trust
measures between the Kuba and non-Kuba samples are reported in panel C of table 2. Of the 18
differences reported, only one is statistically different from zero, and in general, the magnitude
of the differences is quite small.23
Another possibility is that historical state formation also affected altruism. If the Kuba were
less altruistic towards the recipients in the RAG, then this, rather than rule following, could ex-
plain why they are more likely to cheat. To check for this, we also had participants play a version
of the standard dictator game (DG), where participants divide 1,000cf between themselves and
a second player. Each participant played four rounds of the DG, in each round dividing 1,000cf
between themselves and another anonymous individual, either (i) someone from Kananga, (ii)
23As well, the estimates of equation (1) remain robust when controlling for each of the three measures of trust
(appendix table A12).
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someone from the same ethnic group in Kananga, (iii) someone from a different ethnic group
in Kananga, or (iv) the provincial government.24 The estimated differences between the Kuba
and non-Kuba populations are reported in panel E of table 2. We find no statistically significant
difference in the measures of altruism between the two groups.25
A final possibility is that Kuba participants had a better understanding of the games, and there-
fore were better able to understand how they could break the rules and cheat. The experimental
setup was designed so that all participants had a full understanding of the game before playing.
After the rules of the game were explained, participants were asked a series of six questions
that tested their understanding of the procedures of the game. If the participants got any of the
questions wrong, the rules were re-explained, and the participant was asked the same or a similar
set of questions again. This continued until the participant fully understood the experiment and
could answer all questions.
We check for general cognitive differences between Kuba and non-Kuba participants by testing
for differences in the answers to four simple math questions asked during our first visit. As we
reported in panel F of table 2, we find no difference between the two groups. We also check
whether the Kuba had a better initial understanding of the games by examining the proportion
of the six questions (in each game) that participants got wrong when first asked. Our estimates
show no evidence that the Kuba had a better initial understanding.26 Finally, we also check that
our estimates of equation (1) are robust to controlling for these measures (appendix table A14).
7. Examining Causal Channels
We now turn to an examination of potential channels for our finding of greater cheating and less
rule following among Kuba descendants.
A. Transmission of Values from Parents to Children
The model developed in Tabellini (2008b) illustrates an important effect that better functioning
formal institutions can have on cultural like rule following: when the state enforces desirable
24The division was done in the privacy of a tent and was made by placing the money for the other party in an
envelope, sealing it, and then placing it in a bag outside the tent.
25We also confirm that our baseline RAG results are robust to controlling for altruism towards player 2 as measured
by play in the DG (see appendix table A13).
26In fact, the estimated coefficients suggest that if anything Kuba participants got more answers wrong, although
the coefficients are often insignificant.
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behavior, the benefit to parents of fostering an intrinsic preference in their children to engage
in this behavior is reduced. This is because the state ensures good behavior regardless of
individuals’ underlying preferences. Therefore, in equilibrium, better state enforcement can
crowd out intrinsic preferences for socially desirable behavior.27
We explore this mechanism by examining the values that parents report as being important to
teach their children. We measure this using the following survey question, which was taken from
the World Values Survey: “Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at
home. Which, if any, do you consider especially important?” Respondents were then given a list
of the following eleven traits: (i) Obedience; (ii) Feeling of responsibility; (iii) Tolerance/respect
for others; (iv) Unselfishness/generosity; (v) Imagination; (vi) Independence; (vii) Self expression;
(viii) Determination/perseverance; (ix) Hard work; (x) Thrift; (xi) Religious faith. Respondents
were able to respond “yes” to any of the traits they felt were important to instill in their children.
We begin by first examining the extent to which the Kuba believe it is less important, on
average, to teach children these values, which we measure by the proportion of the 11 traits the
respondent answered yes to. Estimates of equation (1) with this measure as the outcome variable
are reported in columns 1–3 of table 3. We find that, on average, the Kuba feel that it is less
important to teach these values to their children.
We next turn to the traits that are most clearly related to rule following, which are the
first four listed: obedience, feeling of responsibility, tolerance/respect for others, and unselfish-
ness/generosity. Using responses for these traits, we examine the fraction of the four traits that a
respondent believes are important to instill in children. Estimates of equation (1) with this as the
dependent variable are reported in columns 4–6 of table 3. We find that, for all three samples of
interest, Kuba parents feel it is significantly less important to instill these values in their children.
This effect is statistically significant and sizable. The difference between the Kuba and non-Kuba
is 0.16, which is sizable relative to the mean of the outcome variable which is about 0.65. The
estimates are also very similar if we use only ‘obedience’ as the outcome, which is arguably the
trait that is most directly related to rule following (see appendix table A15).
Examining differences between the main ethnic groups, we again find that the Kuba are
27Theoretically, it is not the case that better enforcement always crowds-out parental investment (see Bisin and
Verdier, 2001, Hauk and Saez-Marti, 2002, Benabou and Tirole, 2003). In fact, in Tabellini (2008b), enforcement that
specifically targets matches between “distant” players crowds-in parental investment. Given our focus on interactions
between agents within the Kuba state, and not cross-state interactions, it is less likely that this is the empirically
relevant scenario of the model.
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Table 3: Examining the importance of teaching values to children.
Kuba	vs.	all	
others
Central	
Kuba	vs.	
Lele
Bushong	
vs.	Lele
Kuba	vs.	all	
others
Central	
Kuba	vs.	
Lele
Bushong	
vs.	Lele
Kuba	vs.	all	
others
Central	
Kuba	vs.	
Lele
Bushong	
vs.	Lele
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Kuba	ethnicity	indicator -0.062* -0.131** -0.137* -0.078** -0.159** -0.165** -0.019 -0.074 -0.086
(0.035) (0.062) (0.071) (0.038) (0.066) (0.074) (0.045) (0.078) (0.088)
Baseline	covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean	dep	var 0.54 0.52 0.53 0.67 0.63 0.66 0.42 0.44 0.44
Observations 499 105 82 499 105 82 499 105 82
R -squared 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.06
Four	qualities	related	to	rule-
following
Four	qualities	unrelated	to	rule-
following
Notes :Thetable reportsOLSestimates of equation(1).Thedependent variable is the fractionof qualities that the respondent reportsbeing
important to teach children at home. In columns 1-3, the dependent variable is the average across eleven quantities. In columns 4-6, the
dependent variable is the average across four qualities that are related to rule-following: obedience; responsibility; tolerance/respect for
others; unselfishness/generosity. In columns 7-9, the dependent variable is the average across four qualities that are unrelated to rule-
following: independence, imagination, self expression, determination/perseverance. "Kuba ethnicity indicator" isa variable that equalsone
if the individual's self reported tribe is Kuba. Standard errors are clustered at the origin village level. All regressions control for a gender
indicator,age, age squared, anda surveyyearfixed effect. Coefficientsare reportedwith robuststandard errors in parentheses. *,**, and***
indicate	significance	at	the	10,	5,	and	1%	levels.
All	eleven	qualities	listed
Fraction	of	qualities	that	are	viewed	as	being	important	to	teach	children	at	home
‘exceptional’. Among the six largest ethnic groups in our sample, with the exception of the
Bindi, the Kuba are the least likely to report the traits as being important to teach to children.
Ethnicity-level means are reported in appendix figure A3.
We next turn to the traits that are least related to rule following. These estimates for these
four traits provide a nice comparison to the estimates for the rule-following traits. It may be
that the Kuba feel it is less important to teach their children values in general. Alternatively,
it may be that the effect is specific to values related to good behavior and rule following.
The four traits unrelated to rule following are: imagination, independence, self expression and
determination/perseverance. Estimates with the outcome of interest comprising the four traits
are reported in columns 7–9 of table 3. The estimated Kuba effect is also negative, but much
smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant. Thus, the lower importance that the Kuba
place on instilling values in their children appears to be concentrated among values related to
rule following and good behavior.28
Overall, the results show that the Kuba state is associated with less parental investments to
instill rule following values in children.
28Three traits in our list do not map clearly into either group, and therefore we do not include them in either
measure.
24
B. Income and Prosperity
A potential mechanism underlying the effects we find is the greater historical prosperity of
the Kuba Kingdom. The historical formation of states in sub-Saharan Africa tends to be as-
sociated with greater economic activity today (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007, Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou, 2013, 2014a,b), and this was also true for the Kuba Kingdom (Douglas, 1962). If
historical income differences persist, they might explain the differences in rule following that we
observe, especially given existing experimental evidence of the link between income and unethical
behavior (e.g., Piff, Stancato, Cote, Mendoza-Denton and Keltner, 2012, Gino and Pierce, 2009).
We examine this by first checking for income differences between Kuba and non-Kuba descen-
dants (panel A of table 4). Since income is noisy and difficult to measure in resource-poor settings,
we use a wide variety of different measures. Our first measure is a 1–5 index of individuals’
perceived income status.29 We also directly measure an individual’s earned income, over the past
year and over the past month, as well as whether the respondent was unemployed at the time of
the survey. We also collected four additional measures of prosperity: an indicator that equals one
if the house had non-dirt floors, an indicator that equals one if the house had a metal roof, the
number of meals that is typically eaten in a day, and the number of times in the past week that
the respondent went to bed hungry. The last set of measures that we collected were measures of
human capital and health: education, height, and ratio of weight-to-height.
We find weak evidence that Kuba descendants are more prosperous today. In some specifica-
tions, the Kuba do appear to be more wealthy, but this result is not robust across the measures.30
As we report in appendix tables A16 and A17, our findings are robust to controlling for income,
measured using the first principal component of all measures.31
C. The Colonial and Post-Colonial Periods
Another potential explanation for our findings is that, because of the Kuba Kingdom’s pre-
existing state institutions, the Belgian colonists treated the Kuba differently than other groups.
29Respondents were asked to imagine a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is the poorest level on the scale and 5 is the richest.
They were then asked to report the level at which they are situated relative to other people in Kananga.
30One explanation for the lack of a robust difference in prosperity between the Kuba and others is the fact that nearly
everyone in the population is at subsistence. For example, in our sample of 499, the modal number of meals eaten per
day in our sample is one (287 individuals; only 12 eat three meals per day), and the unemployment rate is 63%.
31The height and weight data required our respondents to travel to a local hospital in the city center. Because some
respondents were unable to, or chose not to, make the trip, we are missing these data for 29 individuals. Thus, we
report estimates without and with these variables included as a measure of income.
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Table 4: Balance table for potential mechanisms.
Not	
accounting	
for	baseline	
covariates
Accounting	
for	baseline	
covariates
Not	
accounting	
for	baseline	
covariates
Accounting	
for	baseline	
covariates
Not	
accounting	
for	baseline	
covariates
Accounting	
for	baseline	
covariates
Subjective	income	scale,	1-5 2.162 0.238** 0.188* 2.257 0.012 0.020 2.220 -0.066 -0.009
(0.104) (0.103) (0.170) (0.178) (0.195) (0.206)
ln	Annual	income 13.05 0.161 0.207 13.17 -0.043 -0.308 13.15 -0.100 -0.353
(0.290) (0.289) (0.554) (0.579) (0.614) (0.652)
ln	Monthly	income 10.74 0.122 0.152 10.70 0.073 -0.086 10.66 0.012 -0.178
(0.248) (0.247) (0.463) (0.483) (0.512) (0.541)
Unemployment	indicator 0.631 -0.037 -0.046 0.657 -0.082 -0.141* 0.671 -0.073 -0.148
(0.059) (0.056) (0.094) (0.082) (0.105) (0.090)
Non-dirt	floor 0.367 0.218*** 0.210*** 0.571 0.123 0.062 0.561 0.132 0.087
(0.058) (0.059) (0.098) (0.102) (0.110) (0.117)
Metal	roof 0.930 -0.065** -0.050 0.838 -0.005 0.016 0.854 0.028 0.022
(0.031) (0.031) (0.074) (0.073) (0.079) (0.081)
Meals	per	day 1.449 0.120* 0.092 1.514 0.025 0.036 1.439 -0.132 -0.079
(0.066) (0.065) (0.107) (0.109) (0.121) (0.124)
Nights	hungry	in	last	week 0.615 -0.256* -0.246* 0.524 -0.115 -0.188 0.537 -0.117 -0.218
(0.134) (0.135) (0.172) (0.178) (0.189) (0.192)
Educational	attainment,	0-4 3.024 0.373*** 0.187** 3.524 -0.311** -0.100 3.573 -0.283** -0.168
(0.111) (0.084) (0.135) (0.107) (0.132) (0.110)
Height 166.03 1.776* 0.473 167.42 -0.567 0.879 167.89 0.310 1.212
(1.062) (0.885) (1.642) (1.412) (1.772) (1.612)
Weight-to-height	ratio 0.356 -0.001 0.002 0.347 -0.003 -0.003 0.344 -0.011 -0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Mission	station 0.752 -0.091 -0.094 0.781 -0.0250 0.0206 0.854 0.126 0.168*
(0.071) (0.070) (0.093) (0.096) (0.081) (0.086)
Power	station 0.100 -0.090*** -0.084*** 0.076 -0.182** -0.187** 0.098 -0.182** -0.185**
(0.026) (0.027) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.076)
Railway	line 0.543 0.276*** 0.264*** 0.724 0.424*** 0.418*** 0.671 0.417*** 0.399***
(0.064) (0.067) (0.106) (0.109) (0.115) (0.121)
Mines 0.002 -0.0024 -0.0021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0024) (0.0022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Impact	of	Mobutu,	1-5	scale 4.090 -0.123 -0.043 3.860 0.082 -0.018 3.859 0.101 -0.032
(0.146) (0.146) (0.262) (0.272) (0.303) (0.314)
Perception	of	Mobutu,	1-5	scale 3.894 -0.054 0.026 3.570 0.498* 0.414 3.606 0.700** 0.562*
(0.162) (0.161) (0.292) (0.305) (0.324) (0.335)
Mobutu	ST-IAT	D-Score 0.104 -0.078 -0.082 0.157 -0.122 -0.056 0.185 -0.095 0.002
(0.060) (0.061) (0.096) (0.097) (0.112) (0.113)
Panel	A.	Income	and	Wealth
Panel	B.	Colonial	Influence
Panel	C.	Post	Colonial	Influence
Notes :Thetable reportsbalance statisticsbetweenKuba andnon-Kuba individuals in eachof our three samplesof interest.Differences are reported
without	and	with	controls	for	our	baseline	set	of	covariates.
Sample	
mean
Sample	
mean
Sample	
mean
Full	sample	(n=499)
Central	Kuba	vs.	Lele	sample	
(n=105) Bushong	vs.	Lele	sample	(n=82)
Kuba	vs.	non-Kuba	
difference
Kuba	vs.	non-Kuba	
difference
Kuba	vs.	non-Kuba	
difference
This in turn could have affected beliefs and behaviors concerning rule following. We explore
this mechanism by measuring colonial investments in mines, railroads, electricity stations, and
mission stations.32 Using digitized data from Mantnieks (1951), we construct indicator variables
for the presence of each type of colonial investment within 30 kilometers of an individual’s origin
32Maps showing the locations of the colonial investments are provided in the paper’s online appendix.
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village. The differences in the means of the measures across Kuba and non-Kuba observations
are reported in panel B of table 4. We find that Kuba ancestors were less likely to be near a power
station, but more likely to have been near a railway line. Both of these differences are statistically
significant in each of the three samples.
Motivated by these differences, we re-estimate equation (1), controlling for the colonial control
variables (appendix table A18). The reduced-form Kuba effect remains robust to the inclusion of
these colonial control variables. Although the standard errors increase slightly, the point estimates
remain stable, and in four of the six specifications, the magnitude of the Kuba effect actually
increases after controlling for the colonial covariates. Thus, it is unlikely that the effect we find
works through differential colonial contact.
Another possibility is that the Kuba were treated differently by the government of President
Joseph Mobutu Sese-Seko during the post-colonial period, and that this explains part of the
differences that we observe. Since there is little available data from this period, we focus on
individuals’ subjective attitudes towards President Mobutu. If the regime treated certain areas or
ethnic groups in systematically different ways, this will likely be reflected in individuals’ attitudes
towards the former president. We collected two survey-based measures of attitudes towards
Mobutu. First, we asked respondents to report their view of former President Mobutu, choosing
between: very negative, somewhat negative, neutral, somewhat positive, and very positive. We
also asked respondents their view of the overall impacts of Mobutu, using the same scale. For
both measures, we created variables that take on 1–5 integer values and are increasing in the
positivity of the reported view. Because participants might be unwilling to answer questions
about potentially sensitive political figures truthfully, we also measured individuals’ attitudes
towards former President Mobutu using a single-target implicit association test (ST-IAT). The
test, which is a variant of the original IAT, is intended to measure the positivity or negativity of
individuals’ implicit association of a single target (in our case, Mobutu). The measure of interest is
the ‘D-score’, which captures the extent to which the participant has a positive view of Mobutu.33
The differences between Kuba and non-Kuba respondents are reported in panel C of table 4. In
general, we find no systematic difference between the two groups. The coefficients are generally
small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. If we re-estimate our baseline equation (1)
33Full details of the IAT are provided in the paper’s online appendix. Also see Lowes, Nunn, Robinson and Weigel
(2015) for a test of the validity of the ST-IAT in using food, spiders, and snakes as targets.
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while controlling for these covariates, we obtain very similar estimates (see appendix table A19).
Thus, the reduced-form Kuba effect does not appear to be due to differential treatment during
the post-colonial period.
8. Conclusions
We have investigated the impact of living under a centralized state on internal norms of rule
following. Exploiting a natural experiment that has been well-studied in the anthropology and
history literatures, we have estimated the long-run impacts of the formation of the Kuba King-
dom. The Kingdom arose due to an institutional innovator named Shyaam, and its boundaries
were determined by the local system of rivers. The historical episode is attractive from an
empirical point of view because it took place in a region inhabited by a population that was
ex ante culturally homogeneous, some of whom, specifically the Lele, did not end up within the
Kuba state.
Using two experimental measures of rule following – the resource allocation game (RAG) and
the ultimatum game with the potential for theft (UG) – and examining three samples motivated
by the historical natural experiment, we found a robust negative effect of the Kuba Kingdom on
norms of rule following. Kuba descendants are less likely to follow rules and more likely to steal.
This finding is consistent with recent models where endogenous investments to inculcate values
in children decline when there is an increase in the effectiveness of formal institutions that enforce
socially desirable behavior. Consistent with such a mechanism, we found that Kuba parents feel
that it is less important to teach their children values related to rule following.
We end by reminding the reader of an important caveat of our analysis. We have estimated the
causal impact of one treatment – the presence of the Kuba Kingdom relative to the absence of a
state – on norms of rule following. Although we view our findings as valuable evidence about a
question that is difficult to study empirically, our analysis is only able to assess the causal impact
of a particular bundle of state institutions. We cannot estimate the causal impacts of different
components of the bundle. In particular, whether the effects we find arise due to the state’s
formal judicial system, system of taxation, formal protection of property rights, or the economic
expansion it engendered remains unanswered. To answer this questions, it will be necessary to
accumulate evidence from a variety of states with different characteristics, which would allow for
28
a finer examination of particular aspects of state institutions. We view this as a fruitful avenue
for future research.
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